The question how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of highest interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of imperfect node defense. In this two-stage game, first the Designer defends network connectivity by forming costly links and additionally protecting nodes. Then, the Adversary attacks a fixed number of nodes, aiming to disconnect the network. In contrast to the existing literature, defense is imperfect in the sense that defended nodes can still be destroyed with some fixed probability. We completely characterize the solution of the game for attack budgets of one and two nodes, while for larger budget we present a partial characterization of the solution. To do so, we determine the minimum number of links necessary to construct a network with any degree of connectivity and any given number of essential nodes.
Introduction
Infrastructure networks are a crucial part of the modern society. Airports, internet servers and distribution centers are only some examples. Given this evident importance, the question arises how one should design such networks to optimally defend them against threats like intelligent attacks or natural disasters.
We propose a model of network design with two players, borrowed from Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) . The first player, called the Designer, forms costly bilateral links within a given set of nodes. She may also protect nodes against deletion, however protection is imperfect. The second player, called the Adversary, can then attack a fixed number of nodes, where unprotected nodes along with their respective links are deleted with certainty, protected nodes only with some given probability. The Designer intends to retain a connected residual network after the attack, while the Adversary has the opposing goal.
We aim to characterize equilibrium solutions of the resulting extensive-form zero-sum game. That is, we want to identify the set of possible equilibrium defended networks, all networks the Designer may construct contingent of the model's priors: the attack budget of the adversary, the costs of link formation and defense, and the probability of deletion of defended links.
It is important to understand that in the proposed model the Designer has two defense mechanisms at hand. First, she may decide to directly defend nodes against deletion. Second, she may increase the connectivity of the network to defend it against separation. Thus it is on the one hand possible to design a network of sufficiently high connectivity such that direct node defense is not necessary, on the other hand a minimally connected network with all nodes being protected, or even some intermediate solutions will turn out to be also possibly optimal. This tradeoff between two substitutable defense mechanisms is a key characteristic of the model.
In a first step we fully characterize the set of equilibrium defended networks for attack budgets of one or two nodes. In case the Adversary can attack one node we show that the possible equilibrium defended networks are the empty network, the centrally-protected star and the non-protected circle (Proposition 1). Protected nodes will be present in equilibrium only for high chances of defense and small network size (Corollary 1). For an attack budget of two nodes the possible equilibrium defended networks are the empty network, the centrally-protected star, the fully protected circle and the Harary graph of order 3, as well as one or two networks with an intermediate number of defended nodes (Proposition 3). As for a general attack budget of k a nodes, we aim to limit the set of possible equilibrium defended networks by using the same strategies as before in order to identify all non-connected, 1-connected and maximally connected possible equilibrium defended networks (Lemma 4), as well as a set of k a -connected networks that include all possible equilibria (Conjecture 2).
The paper also contributes to the literature of graph theory, generalizing an early and seminal result of Harary (1962) , who gives the minimum number of links needed to construct a network with a given degree of connectedness. 1 Here, we determine the minimum number of links necessary to construct a network with a given degree of connectedness and a given number of essential nodes (Proposition 2, Proposition 4 and Conjecture 1). Essential nodes are those nodes whose deletion will result in a strictly less connected network.
Related literature
This paper is connected to two strands of literature. The first and obvious is the literature on network design, where various papers contributed in the last years. Closest to this work are Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) , who solve the same model we look at here, but for perfect node defense. In Goyal and Vigier (2013) and Cerdeiro et al. (2015) contagion is added, i.e. all undefended nodes connected to an attacked node will also be deleted. In Goyal and Vigier (2010) the players decide on sizes of attack and defense, while the node destruction is decided with a Tullock contest. Among others, Hoyer and De Jaegher (2010) look at node and link deletion, but disregard defense in their model. Finally, in the case of decentralized defense (see e.g. Dziubinski and Goyal, 2013; Hoyer, 2012) any node is assumed to be a rational agent, aiming to protect itself against deletion.
The second, older strand of literature is the graph theoretic literature on connectedness, where Harary (1962) provided an early seminal contribution, identifying the minimum number of links necessary to construct a network of given degree of connectedness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while Section 3 presents the easily accessible solution for an attack budget of one. In Section 4 the solution of the game for an attack budget of two is characterized, while in Section 5 the same ideas are used for a partial characterization of the solution in case of a general attack budget. Section 6 finally concludes.
The Model
We want to introduce imperfect defense into the network design model of Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) . In order to do so consider the following. Let N be a given set of nodes with cardinality n. A link (edge) between two nodes i, j ∈ N is denoted by ij, and we define the complete network (graph) by g N = {ij | i, j ∈ N }, i.e. the network where any two nodes are linked. Finally, we can now define the set of all networks
This model is defined as follows. There are two players, the Designer and the Adversary, playing a two-stage game. In the first stage the Designer chooses network g, where each link comes at a constant and exogenously given cost c l . At the same time she also may defend nodes at a cost c d . Denote the set of these nodes by D ⊆ N . In the second stage, the Adversary, having an exogenously given attack budget k a , chooses which k a nodes to attack, denoted by A ⊆ N . Unprotected nodes are destroyed with probability 1, while protected nodes are destroyed with probability π ∈ (0, 1). Like this, for the case π = 0 we obtain exactly the model of Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) .
In the paper at hand we will study the Connectivity Game, i.e. we study the case that the Designer aims to retain a connected residual network, while the Adversary tries to disconnect the network. 2 Defining X to be the set of all links adjacent to deleted nodes, we obtain an ex-post payoff to the Designer given as
where g − X is the residual network after the attack. Moreover, defining Π(g, D, A) as the probability that network g with defense D gets disconnected by attack A, the corresponding expected payoff is given by
As we want the Adversary to have the opposite goal of the Designer, we simply define his ex-post utility as
Clearly, the Connectivity Game sets rather extreme incentives for the players. In terms of the Designer he gets a constant payoff of 1 whenever the network is connected and 0 otherwise. Some different utility functions are reasonable and existent in the network design literature, a prominent example being a utility function defined as the sum over all components of functions convex in component sizes (see e.g. Dziubiński and Goyal, 2013) . However, retaining connectivity is still a relevant and important goal in many examples and also constitutes the starting point of the corresponding graph-theoretic literature in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, we will see that also in this simple version of the model we will be able to obtain some interesting findings.
The two different defense strategies the Designer has at hand now become apparent. On the one hand, directly defending nodes against deletion at a cost c d is an obvious strategy, while this defense is supposed to be imperfect in our model. On the other hand, adding more costly links to the network in order to increase the connectivity constitutes a second strategy of defense, as e.g. a circle network cannot be disconnected by deletion of only one node, independently of node defense. While these two defense strategies clearly behave as substitutes : Possible equilibrium networks for n = 6 nodes and attack budget k a = 1. Green colored node is protected.
in the model, we will see in the following that it may still be optimal to combine both.
The combination of the two defense mechanisms in an optimal defense strategy represents a central difference to the case of perfect defense, which is found in Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) and constitutes the limit case of π = 0 in the model at hand. It is easy to see that for perfect defense, regardless of the attack budget k a of the Adversary the optimal strategy for the Designer is one out of the following three networks: the empty network for high costs, a star network with protected center, or an unprotected (k a + 1)-connected network with minimal number of links (see Figure 1 for k a = 2). 3 Thus, in this limit case the Designer chooses only one out of the two defense mechanisms, either a minimally connected but protected network or an unprotected but highly connected one.
We will now analyze the model first for attack budgets k a = 1 and k a = 2, and finally for a general attack budget k a ≥ 3.
Attack Budget 1
We want to start by the analysis of the game in case of an attack budget k a = 1. While we will see that in this case the possible equilibria do not differ from the results in the perfect defense framework, we will see that being able to choose between the two available defense strategies (direct defense vs. increased connectivity), directly defending nodes is part of the equilibrium solution for the Designer only for low costs and high success probability of node defense.
As a starting point, the following result shows that if the Adversary can attack at most one node, then for any number of nodes n ≥ 3 the equilibrium defended networks are as in Figure 1 .
Proposition 1.
Let the attack budget of the Adversary be 1. For any number of nodes n ≥ 3, the set of possible equilibrium defended networks is given by the undefended empty network g ∅ , the undefended circle g c and the centrally-protected star (henceforth CP-star) g s .
• The circle is the equilibrium defended network if c l ≤ 1/n and c l ≤ c d + π.
• The empty network is the equilibrium defended network if c l ≥ 1/n and
• The CP-star is the equilibrium defended network if
The proof is rather immediate, understanding that the g c is the Harary graph of order 2, and the star is the tree with the lowest number of essential nodes.
Proof. 1. There cannot be any equilibrium networkg with or without defense with m > n links, as
2. By Harary (1962) we know that a 2-connected network needs to have at least n links. Moreover, the circle g c is the unique 2-connected network with n links:
In any 2-connected network with n links each node has exactly 2 links. Thus deleting one node results by definition in a 1-connected residual network with n − 1 nodes and n − 2 links (a tree), and exactly two leafs, what necessarily constitutes a line. Now, the only possibility to get a 2-connected network out of a line by adding one node and 2 links is constructing a circle.
3. Any 1-connected network trivially has at least n − 1 links. Further, it has to be protected in order to constitute a payoff higher than 0 (the payoff of the empty network). It is clear that in any such tree the leafs are non-essential nodes. The CP-Star is the only tree with a unique essential node.
4. No non-connected network can generate higher payoff than the empty network (same revenue, lower costs).
5. The cost combinations given in Proposition 1 are immediately result from the comparison of the expected utility to the Designer yielded by the three networks g ∅ , g c and g s .
The equilibria for different costs are depicted in Figure 2 , for π ∈ {0, 1/(4n), 1/(2n), 3/(4n), 1/n}. Why it is enough to consider a maximum π of 1/n is shown in the following Lemma.
Figure 2: Equilibrium defended networks for π ∈ [0, 1/n]. As the success probability of attack π increases, the triangle region, where the CP-star is the optimal defended network, shrinks. For π > 1/n (black lines), the CP-star cannot be an equilibrium any more.
Proof. The utility of the Designer from choosing the circle or the CP-star is
such that she would prefer the CP-star over the circle whenever
If now π > 
such that the Designer will prefer to choose the unprotected empty network.
Notice that this result does not depend on the relative sizes of payoff and costs.
The threshold π = 1/n stays the same if the payoff would increase linearly in the number of nodes, i.e. if we considered a payoff in case of successful defensẽ
Lemma 1 has also a direct consequence for large networks. The following corollary can also be understood as a limit analysis for n → ∞.
Corollary 1.
For any positive success probability π and large enough network size n, a defended network cannot be an equilibrium.
We see that especially for large networks, as the Designer has the choice between the two defense mechanisms of direct defense and high network connectivity, the possibility of unsuccessful defense in most cases lets her decide in favor of higher connectivity of the network.
In the following section we will see that the picture slightly changes if the attack budget of the Adversary increases. Already for an attack budget k a = 2 the Designer suddenly also has "intermediate" choices, i.e. it may be optimal for her to choose a network including a degree of connectivity larger than 1 and at the same time defending some nodes.
Attack Budget 2
We want to characterize the possible equilibrium defended networks in case of an attack budget k a = 2 to the Adversary. We will find that the networks we found in the previous section are still part of the solution. In fact, in Section 5 we will define a set of possible equilibrium defended networks recursively. What notably complicates the following analysis as compared to the previous section is that the Designer from now on has not only the possibility to choose between defending the network by either strategically defending essential nodes or increasing the network connectivity, but combining these two measures by constructing 2-connected networks with a strict subset of nodes being essential and thus defended.
Before turning to the results we want to further elaborate on this central point by presenting an easily accessible example.
Example 1. The set of possible equilibrium defended networks for n = 8 nodes and 2 units of attack are the empty network g ∅ , the CP-star g s , the fully defended circle g c and the Harary graph of order 3 g h,3 (the wheel),together with a bipartite network of groups 3 and 5, where the smaller group is protected. All these networks are depicted in Figure 3 . 4 Instead of presenting all lengthy calculations to determine cost regions for each
Figure 3: Possible equilibrium networks for n = 8 nodes and attack budget k a = 2. Green colored nodes are protected.
network to be the equilibrium solution, in this example we show the solutions graphically in Figure 4 for various values of π. 5 The figures show that indeed there exist cost ranges and values of π for each of the 5 networks to be the equilibrium solution of the network design game. While g * is only a possible solution for low but positive success probability of attack π and low costs, obviously all networks with defended nodes vanish as solutions for large π.
Let us now start the analysis of the game in case of k a = 2 by collecting some first intuitive and easily provable facts.
Lemma 2.
Let the attack budget be k a = 2. The following statements hold true.
• The only possible non-connected equilibrium defended network is the undefended empty network g ∅ .
• The only possible 1-connected equilibrium defended network is the CP-star g s .
• The only possible 3-connected equilibrium defended network is the undefended Harary graph of order 3, g h,3 . 6
All of these statements are the same or equivalent to those in the previous section (Proposition 1), such that a proof can be omitted here.
So far, we have found nothing qualitatively different from the previous case, 0 0.4 as the networks that are equilibria in the boundary case of perfect defense are necessarily part of the solution here. However, in the following we will show that in the class of 2-connected networks there are more candidates to be found.
To provide some intuition why we should expect more possible equilibrium defended networks in the class of 2-connected networks, notice that the expected payoff of the CP-star is 1 − π, while of the Harary graph of order 3 it is 1, net of costs. Any 2-connected network will yield a payoff of 1 − π 2 , net of costs.
such that we can see that whenever we can find a network 2-connected network with less links than the Harary graph, there will be a cost level such that for low π this network may be payoff-better in expected terms. On the other side, the network may make use of more links and more defense than the CP-star, as it yields a higher probability of success.
In order to find these 2-connected networks, we first need to identify optimal combinations of links and essential nodes. As link formation and units of defense are costly, the Designer needs to make sure that for any number of defended nodes, she uses the smallest possible number of links to create the network. In the following, we will call a network minimal if there does not exist another network with the same number of essential nodes and degree of connectedness and strictly less links. 7
We will first present a lemma that essentially tells us that we have to distinguish not 2 groups of nodes (essential and non-essential), but 3 groups of nodes. The reason is that an essential node that is connected to non-essential nodes needs to have more links than one that is not. We will also collect some properties of nodes in each group.
Lemma 3.
In minimal 2-connected networks with p essential nodes
• the q = n − p non-essential nodes have at least 2 links, both to essential nodes.
• the p q ≤ p essential nodes that are connected to non-essential nodes have at least 3 links.
• the remaining p − p q essential nodes have at least 2 links.
The proof is the special case k a = 2 of Lemma 5 in the following section. Notice that we have already established two lower bounds for the number of links. First, any node has at least two links, yielding a lower bound of n links in the network. Second, the first bullet point of Lemma 3 yields a lower bound of 2q links. While for small q this lower bound may be even lower than the other one, we will in the subsequent proposition that it will be tight for large enough q.
The following proposition will now give the minimum number of links necessary to construct a 2-connected network with given number of essential nodes. The main idea will be to find the optimal number of nodes p q of essential nodes to have links to non-essential nodes.
Proposition 2.
Let n ≥ 4. The minimum number of links in a 2-connected network with 2 ≤ q ≤ n − 2 non-essential nodes is
where N (q) ⊆ P is the minimal set of neighbors such that
In the proof, we first show that (4.1) is a lower bound for such networks by combining the ideas of Lemma 3, and then show that networks with these specifications can indeed be constructed.
easy to construct a network where all links are essential but there exists a different network with the same degree of connectedness and the same number of essential nodes, but less links.
Proof. Denote by P the set of essential nodes and Q the set of non-essential nodes. Let finally P q ⊆ P denote those nodes in P that are connected to nodes in Q.
To establish 4.1 as a lower bound for the number of links needed to construct a 2-connected network with q non-essential nodes, we observe that this is a special case of the more general Proposition 4, for k a = 2. Then it is easy to understand that (5.1) collapses to (4.1), for q > 1. To understand that (5.2) in case of k a = 2 collapses to (4.2) observe first that
and then 2q
This already establishes the lower bound.
It is left to show that for each n, q a 2-connected network with links as in (4.1) exists. In order to understand that observe that for p > p q the number of nodes in p q is ⌊2(q + 1)/3⌋, and thus the Harary graph of order 3 for p q nodes has q + 1 links. Connecting each two nodes in P q via at least one node in Q or a line of all nodes in P \P q . If P q = P and 3p > 2q then one direct link must be added. Figures  5a -5c show examples of such minimal networks. Finally, it is clear that this construction is only valid for P q ≥ 4. However, for smaller P q the construction is straightforward, as is shown in Figures 5d -5f.
In Figure 6 the minimum number of links given by Proposition 2 are shown for all possible numbers of essential nodes, for the cases of n = 15 and n = 17 nodes in the network. What is left is to determine those networks within this set of candidates who may indeed be equilibrium solutions of the defense game, for specific combinations of costs c l and c d , as well as attack probability π. The following proposition will identify these networks by making use of the linearity of costs. The idea of the proof can also be seen in Figure 6 . By linearity of costs, and as all 2-connected networks yield the same payoff of 1 − π 2 , net of costs, the possible equilibrium defended networks are those lying on the lower left side of the convex hull of all points given by Proposition 2 in the cost space. 8
(a) n = 10, q = 6
Figure 5: Minimal 2-connected networks for different n, q. Green colored nodes are essential.
Proposition 3.
Let n ≥ 7. The set of possible equilibrium defended networks is given by
where g ∅ the undefended empty network, g h,3 the undefended Harary graph of order 3, g s the CP-star, g c the completely defended circle, g * the minimal 2-connected network for q * = ⌈(3n − 2)/5⌉, andg a network such that p = p * + 2 and L(g) = L(g * ) − 1.
Proof. The proof is structured in five parts.
1. For any p < p * , the minimal network cannot be payoff-better than both g * and g h,3 . Observe first that q * is the minimal number of essential nodes such that p * q = p * , not only for permutations of the set of nodes but also for all networks that have the same degree of connectedness and contain the same number of links as well as of essential and non-essential nodes. There are, for example, many ways to construct Harary graphs of higher orders.
as otherwise by Equation (4.2) it would need to hold that
what constitutes a contradiction. Equivalently, for q = q * − 1
what is again a contradiction. Thus, in this network the number of links is 2q * + 1 {3n>5q} by Equation (4.1), and as q * = ⌈(3n − 2)/5⌉ it is 3n > 5q * ⇐⇒ n ≡ 2, 4mod 5.
Moreover, we know that for any g such that q > q * it is |g| = 2q, by Proposition 2, as 3n < 5(q * + 1) ≤ 5q. For this network g to be an equilibrium solution, it needs to hold that 4) in order to be payoff-better than both g * and the Harary graph of order 3. We show that these two equations cannot both be satisfied for g such that q = q * + 1 and therefore |g| = 2(q * + 1). For allq > q * + 1 the proof is then a direct consequence. Equation (4.3) yields
where we used that |g * | ≤ 2q * + 1. On the other hand, Equation (4.4) yields
Now, for both (4.5) and (4.6) to be satisfied at the same time it needs to hold that
what is a contradiction to the assumption that n ≥ 7.
2. For n > p > p * , the only possible networks satisfy n − p = 3r + 2 for r ≥ 0. For n > p > p * , we know that p q < p and thus the number of links in a corresponding network g is
for p q defined as in (4.2). Comparing two minimal networks g andg with q and q + 1 non-essential nodes, it is 2(q + 1)
such that whenever p q+1 = p q + 1 then g cannot be an equilibrium defended network because forg corresponding to q + 1 the network has the same number of links while having one essential node less. Observe now that for p q < p we have that p q = ⌊2(q + 1)/3⌋ and thus we know that the only possible equilibrium defended networks satisfy q = 3r + 2 for r ≥ 0.
3. For any of these, only the maximum (i.e. the one with maximal r) is possible. Denote this by g r . Take two networks g r−1 and g r , where 0 ≤ r − 1 < r and q r−1 = 2 + 3(r − 1), q r = 2 + 3r. For g r−1 to be an equilibrium defended network for some cost level it needs to be payoff-better than both g r and the completely defended circle.
what cannot be both satisfied at the same time.
4. For n ≡ 3, 4mod 5, n − p * = 3(r + 1) + 2, thus g r cannot be an equilibrium defended network by the arguments of step 3. Let n ≡ 3, 4mod 5, then
For n = 8, it is q * = 5 = 3 · 1 + 2, and for n = 8 + 5r, r ≥ 1 it is thus q * = 3n 5 = 3 · 8 + 15r 5 = 3(r + 1) + 2.
For n = 9 + 5r the same argument yields the result.
both5. For n ≡ 0mod 5, n − p * = 3r, while |g * | = |g r |, thus g r cannot be an equilibrium defended network, as g * will be cheaper for all positive costs c d .
Let n ≡ 0mod 5, then
and thus for n = 5r, r ≥ 1 it is q * = 3r. Now, it is by (4.1)
as 3(5r − 3r) = 2 · 3r, and
as in g r it is p q = p − 1.
In Figure 6 , for all numbers of essential nodes, the minimum number of necessary links to construct a 2-connected network is given, and the possible equilibrium defended networks as given in Proposition 3 are identified. This shows that indeed all of the networks given in Proposition 3 are possible equilibrium solutions of the defense game.
Note finally that in the definition of the game in Section 2 we did not allow the Adversary to attack the same node twice instead of attacking two different nodes. However, in case of k a = 2 we can now see that this would not change the results qualitatively, as the only possibility would be to attack the CP-star center node twice. However, as
the set Λ(n) of possible equilibrium defended networks would stay the same. Figure 7: Equilibrium defended networks for n = 15, n = 17, for a given defense probability π and all cost combinations.
Limit behavior
In Section 3 we saw that the only defended network, the CP-star, was not part of the solution set if the number of nodes n was big enough compared to the destruction probability π. We now argue that this result does not hold anymore already in the present case of k a = 2. The main reason for this is that the difference in links between the star and the unprotected Harary graph is now growing in n. Precisely, we have
and thus
such that we see that here in the limit of n → ∞ only for zero link costs the Harary graph of order 3 can be payoff-better than the CP-star.
Again, we can instead of u D alternatively consider a utility function where the payoff grows with the number of nodes in the network. As in the previous Section, consider a utility functionũ D , where in case of a connected residual network the payoff isũ
and consider again the payoff of g s and g h,3 . One gets
This yields that in the limit n → ∞ the Harary graph of order 3 is payoff-better than the CP-star if and only if
such that again the CP-star is a possible solution of the defense game for any network size.
Having fully characterized the set of possible equilibrium defended networks for an attack budget of k a = 2, we now have an idea how to approach the problem for a general attack budget. However, while the ideas will stay the same, there will arise some problems forcing us to only partially characterize the solution in the general setup.
Attack Budget k a
We now want to accomplish the same analysis of the previous section for a general attack budget k a . The idea will be the same as before, such that we need to characterize the minimum number of links needed to construct a k a -connected network with a given number of p essential links. Observe however that we now have to consider a lot more networks, as for any degree of connectedness 1 ≤ k < k a there may still be networks that are part of the solution. This fact makes it impossible for us to completely characterize the set of possible equilibrium defended networks Λ(n). However, we will show that some obvious candidates are part of the solution and we will furthermore define a set of networks that we can show to include all possible k a -connected equilibrium defended networks.
We start again with a lemma that comprises some first and easily derivable results, where we see that the obvious candidates, that is the empty network, the CP-star and the Harary graph of k a + 1 are again part of the solution.
Lemma 4.
Let the attack budget be k a . The following statements hold true.
• The only possible (k a + 1)-connected equilibrium defended network is the undefended Harary graph of order k a + 1, g h,ka+1 .
Again we omit a proof, as it is structurally equivalent to the proof of Proposition 1 in Section 3.
Instead, we turn to characterize more possible equilibria of the defense game.
Intuitively it should be clear that in the general case we get a more diverse set of possible equilibrium defended networks. While it is easy to characterize the networks that are non-connected, 1-connected or (k a + 1) connected (as we saw in the previous Lemma), we now also have to think about all networks of connectivity 2, 3, ..., k a , and each time with any number of essential nodes.
To assess this problem we aim to partially characterize the set Λ(n, k a ) of possible equilibrium defended networks by recursively identifying a class of networks Γ(n, k a ) that we can show to include Λ(n, k a ). The idea will be the same as in the previous section: We identify the minimal k a -connected networks for any number of essential nodes and subsequently identify those that may be a solution to the game by exploiting the linearity of costs.
The following lemma, equivalently to Lemma 3 assesses the role of non-essential nodes in a k a -connected network.
Lemma 5.
In minimal k a -connected networks with p essential nodes, the q = n − p nonessential nodes have at least k a links, all of them to essential nodes. Thus, any such network has at least k a q links.
Proof. Remember that it is clear that any node in a k a -connected network has at least k a links, as the deletion of all neighbors leaves a node isolated and thus disconnects a network. Let nowḡ be a network such that P = {1, .., p} are the essential nodes. Suppose further thatḡ contains a link between two nodes i, j / ∈ P . Then it is clear that g − ij is again k a -connected with the same set of separators. To see that note that by Menger's Theorem there are at least k a node-disjoint paths between any two nodes inḡ, and as (N − P ) are non-separating there are also at least k a node-disjoint paths between any two nodes in N \{i} for any i ∈ (N − P ). Then it is already clear that all of these paths remain existing inḡ − ij, leaving the connectivity and the set of non-separators unchanged.
Suppose now there are no links between non-separating nodes. Knowing that any node in a k a -connected network has at least k a links we know that there are k a q nodes from non-separating to separating nodes, what yields the result.
We now characterize all minimal k a -connected equilibrium defended networks. Remember first that the minimal k a -connected network has ⌈k a n/2⌉ links. We denote this network by g h,ka , the Harary graph of order k a . It is clear that in this network all nodes are essential, such that the possible equilibrium defended network is the fully defended Harary graph.
Similar to the case of k a = 2 in Section 4, we can now deduce the number of links necessary to construct a k a -connected network with exactly p essential nodes, i.e. p nodes contained in separating k a -cuts. Remember that by Lemma 5 the q = n − p non-essential nodes all have exactly k a links, all of them to essential nodes, yielding a lower bound of k a q links. Moreover, we know that any neighbor of a non-essential node has to have at least k a + 1 links. Thus the idea is, again similar to Section 4, to determine the optimal number p q of essential nodes connected to non-essential nodes. A remaining issue is the construction of the networks we find. The idea in the previous section was to establish the number of links as a lower bound and subsequently provide a construction algorithm for a network of this degree of connectedness, as well as numbers of essential nodes and links. In this general case we will also provide a construction algorithm for a network and argue that it is a valid candidate. However, a proof for this conjecture is not provided. Notice therefore that the following proposition only provides a lower bound on the number of links, while afterwards we will add the conjecture and the construction algorithm for the networks.
Proposition 4.
Let n be big enough, then a lower bound for the minimum number of links in a k a -connected network with 1 ≤ q ≤ n − k a non-essential nodes is given by
where p q = |P q | and P q ⊆ P is the set of neighbors of non-essential nodes, such that
( 5.2) Proof. 1. G(p q ) as defined in (5.1) is a lower bound for a k a -connected network of q non-essential nodes with p q neighbors. By Lemma 5, it is clear that non-essential neighbors have exactly k a links. Further, there need to be at least k a links between the p q neighbors of nonessential nodes and the remaining p−p q essential nodes, yielding k a q+k a 1 {p>pq} links. Moreover, the p q neighbors of non-essential nodes need to have at least k a + 1 links, while the remaining p − p q nodes need to have at least k a links, what together yields (5.1).
2. To determine the minimum number of links, we need to find the p q that minimizes (5.1). It is enough to find the minimum p q such that G(p q ) ≤ G(p q + 1) and to show that for this p q it is also G(p q ) ≤ G(p q − 1).
Define F (p q ) to be equal to G(p q ) − k a q when disregarding the ceiling function, i.e.
Consider the first of these two cases. We need to distinguish between p q < p − 1 and p q = p − 1.
• p q < p − 1. Then
• p q = p − 1. Then
We observe that the two boundaries coincide.
Consider instead the second case, such that F (p q ) = F (p q + 1) + 1 2 and (5.3) even. We again distinguish p q < p − 1 and p q = p − 1
Notice again that the two boundaries coincide. Finally, we plugp q = ka(q+1)−2 ka+1
into (5.3) and notice that the maximum functions are zero, such that
such that we know that the condition simplifies to (5.4) being even.
It is left to show that for the optimal p q as defined in (5.2) it is also G(p q ) ≤ G(p q − 1). We will consider the sufficient criterion F (p q ) ≤ F (p q − 1) and show that this is always satisfied for p q given by (5.2). Observe that we only need to consider p q < p here, as otherwise the above the above would yield G(p − 1) > G(p) and we would directly know that p q = p is optimal. Thus, for p q < p it is
and it is clear that for all k a ≥ 1
Altogether, we have now shown that (5.1) and (5.2) yield a lower bound for a k a -connected network with p critical links.
In the following it is argued that the lower bound given in Proposition 4 might be tight, meaning that there indeed exist networks of any given degree of connectedness and number of essential nodes, that have exactly the number of links given in (5.1) and (5.2) of Proposition 4. We formally give this statement in the following conjecture and will subsequently present a corresponding construction algorithm.
Conjecture 1.
G(p q ) as given by (5.1) and (5.2) is the minimum number of links in a k aconnected network with 1 ≤ q ≤ n − k a non-essential nodes.
The idea is to construct such a k a -connected network with exactly G(p q ) links. Proposition 4 then guarantees that there cannot be a network with the given characteristics and less links.
Consider the following construction. Define the set of non-essential nodes as Q = {n 1 , ..., n q }, their neighbors P q = {c 1 , ..., c pq } and all other essential nodes P \P q as {c pq+1 , ..., c p }. Consider now the following construction. Let p q < q and p q = p. Then for i = 1, ..., p, n i is connected to c i , ..., c i+ka−1 (mod p), while for i = p + 1, ..., q, n i is connected to c i−p , c i−p+⌈p/ka⌉ , ..., c i−p+(ka−1)⌈p/ka⌉ (mod p). If q − p < ⌈ p ka ⌉, then connect the smallest c i with k a links to c i+⌈p/ka⌉ (mod p), until all essential nodes have k a + 1 neighbors. Let p q < q and p q < p. Again, for i = 1, ..., p q , n i is connected to c i , ..., c i+ka−1 (mod p q ), while for i = p q + 1, ..., q, n i is connected to c i−pq , c i−pq+⌈pq/ka⌉ , ..., c i−pq+(ka−1)⌈pq/ka⌉ (mod p q ). Now, the nodes c pq+1 , ..., c p form a Harary graph of order k a in the following way. Consider the nodes c q−pq+1 , c q−pq+1+⌈pq/ka⌉ , ..., c q−pq+1+(ka−1)⌈pq/ka⌉ (mod p q ) as being one nodec. Then c pq+1 , ..., c p andc form a Harary graph of order k a , where each node inc gets one connection. Finally, if one of the nodes in c pq+1 , ..., c p andc has k a + 1 links and there exists a node in c 1 , ..., c pq having only k a links, w.l.o.g. the node with k a + 1 links will bec, where the node with smallest index in c 1 , ..., c pq having only k a links is added toc. Finally, if still nodes in c 1 , ..., c pq have only k a links, then connect the smallest c i with k a links to c i+⌈p/ka⌉ (mod p q ), until all essential nodes have k a + 1 neighbors. In this construction, if c pq+1 , ..., c p are less than k a nodes, the formation of a Harary graph is not possible. This is the case as
where the latter case is a contradiction, while the first case yields the above condition. In this case c pq+1 , ..., c p form a completely connected subgraph of and all of them are additionally connected to k a − (p − p q − 1) nodes from c q−pq+1 , c q−pq+1+⌈pq/ka⌉ , ..., c q−pq+1+(ka−1)⌈pq/ka⌉ (mod p q ) as well as those nodes in c 1 , ..., c pq having only k a links.
Finally, let p q ≥ q. Observe that for k a ≥ 3 this can only be the case if q ≤ k a , as from (5.2) it follows that
and for q = k a + 1 it is
Having understood this, we deduce that q ≤ p q = k a , as any non-essential node has to be connected to k a distinct essential nodes. The construction in this case works as follows. All nodes in Q are connected to all nodes in P q , such that the k a nodes in P q each have q links. Notice that these nodes need at least one more link each. Now, consider as before all nodes in P q as one artificial nodec. Then all nodes in P \P q together withc form a Harary graph of order k a , where the k a links ofc are divided such that every node get one of the links. Finally, there might be links missing in P q . If every node misses one link, then add links in pairs.
If they lack more links, then add a Harary graph of this degree for all nodes in P q .
Argumentation for Conjecture 1. Consider first a network constructed as above for the case where p q = q. Consider furthermore k a = 3. For such an example consider Figure 8 . In the following we will distinguish non-essential nodes Q between "outside" nodes n 1 , ..., n pq , and "inside" nodes n t , t > p q . This terminology is motivated by the above construction, see Figures 8 and 9.
We need to show that there exist three node-distinct paths between any two nodes in the network, while not using one arbitrary non-essential node. This can however be heavily simplified. We will instead show that there exist 1) three different paths between any two nodes in P q , 2) node-distinct paths from any 3 nodes in P q to any other 3 nodes in P q , and 3) node-distinct paths from any node in P q to any 3 nodes in P q , while we are always free not to use one arbitrary node in Q.
1) Take any two nodes in P q , call them c s and c t . W.l.o.g. let s < t and call c s+1 , ..., c t−1 the right-hand side and c t+1 , .., c s−1 the right-hand side. Observe that 3 links leave c s to the outside, call them the left, middle and right link. The middle link can leave to the right (node c s+1 ) or to the left (c s−1 ). Analogously, 3 links leave c t to the outside. Distinguish now the following cases.
• c s and c t are directly connected through an inside node. Then there are additionally two paths left and one path right on the outside, or vice versa.
• There is an inside connection from c s to some node in P q on the left-hand side, and an inside connection from c t to some node on the right-hand side. Leave c s with two paths to the right, one of which will hit the node connected to c t via the inside. The other reaches c t via the right link.
Leave c s to the left and via the inside connection. Both paths will hit c t from the left-hand side, one via the left, one via the middle link.
• There is an inside connection from c s to some node in P q on the left-hand side, and an inside connection from c t to some node on the left-hand side. Leave c s with two paths to the right-hand side, hitting c t through the right and the middle link. Leave c s to the left to encounter the node connected to c t via the inside. Leave c s via the inside, and continue on the left-hand side to hit c t via the left link.
In any case, there are 4 node-distinct paths, such that 3 paths remain whenever one chooses to omit some non-essential node.
2) Take any node c s and any group (c t 1 , c t 2 , c t 3 ), all within P q . Again, one can find node-distinct paths from c s to the three nodes (c t 1 , c t 2 , c t 3 ), while it is possible not to use one arbitrary non-essential node. If t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ≤ p q , then the proof is as in case (1) above, noticing that the three nodes lie on the circle of essential nodes connected to non-essential nodes, such that there is a left, center and right node. If on the other hand for some t i it is t i > p q , then exchange c t i for either the node c u such that u ≤ p q and c t i and c u are connected, or if this node is also part of (c t 1 , c t 2 , c t 3 ), any other nodec u that is not part of (c t 1 , c t 2 , c t 3 ) and connected to a node c r such that r > p q . Like this we again reduced the problem to be similar to case (1).
3) Take any two groups (c s 1 , c s 2 , c s 3 ) and (c t 1 , c t 2 , c t 3 ) of nodes within P q . Again, the same arguments can be used to show that there exist node-distinct paths from c s i to c t i , i = 1, 2, 3, with the possibility not to use any non-essential node. The most difficult case is if (c s 1 , c s 2 , c s 3 ) and (c t 1 , c t 2 , c t 3 ) lie on two different sides of the circle c 1 , .., c pq (if some s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 > p q , the argument works as in case (2) above). As in case (1) there are two node-distinct paths to the left and two to the right on the outside, while one path may start via the inside. Thus indeed all arguments work as in case (1).
Due to the symmetry of the construction the extension of the above to higher degrees of connectedness is straightforward.
Finally, we want to use the result of Conjecture 1 to characterize the possible equilibrium defended networks Λ(n, k a ) in case of an arbitrary attack budget k a . To this end we will recursively define a set of network that we can show to include Λ(n, k a ). These networks will be those with minimum number of essential nodes for any number of links more than the Harary graph g h,ka of order k a , and less than g * , which is again the network with the minimum number of non-essential nodes such that p = p q . Formally, the conjecture is the following. 
Conjecture 2.
The set of possible k a -connected equilibrium defended networks is a subset of
where g * is the minimal network with minimum number of non-essential nodes such that p = p q , while g min l for 1 ≤ l < |g * |−⌈ nka 2 ⌉ is the network with ⌈ nka 2 ⌉+l links and the minimum possible number of essential nodes.
To understand the idea of Conjecture 2, consider Figures 10a and 10a. The networks that are possible equilibria of the game are those with optimal combinations of essential nodes and number of links on the flatter right part of the graphs. However, one can see that not all of these are necessarily in Λ(n, k a ).
Proof. It is clear that no network with more essential nodes than g * other than the g min l for 1 ≤ l < |g * | − ⌈ nka 2 ⌉ can be equilibrium defended networks, as there always exist one g min l with the same number of links and less essential nodes.
We need to prove that no network with less essential nodes than g * can be an equilibrium defended network. Note first that for these networks it is always
as p * is the largest to satisfy p * q = p * . Let us therefore consider the largest p to satisfy (5.5), that is let p = kn 2k + 1 . The idea will be to calculate the slope of a line between the two points referring to the network g with p essential nodes and the Harary graph of order k a + 1 (consider e.g. Figure 10a ). We know that g has k a (n − p) links, while g h,ka+1
has ⌈(k a + 1)n/2⌉ links. This yields a slope of k a (n − ⌊ 
=
(4k a + 2)k a n − 2k 2 a n − (2k a + 1)(k a + 1)n − (4k a + 2) 2k a n = − k a n + n + 4k a + 2 2k a n .
Further, we know that in order to add one non-essential node at the expense of one essential node ifp ≤ p one needs to add exactly k a links, yielding a slope of −k a . On the other hand, the above slope is even larger than −1, as k a n + n + 4k a + 2 2k a n ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ k a n + n + 4k a + 2 ≤ 2k a n ⇐⇒ n(k a − 1) ≥ 4k a + 2
what yields the result. 
Conclusion
We proposed a model of network design with imperfect defense as an extension of Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) . The Designer chooses a network for a given number of nodes and can additionally choose to protect nodes against deletion, where protection is imperfect. Subsequently, the Adversary attacks a fixed number of nodes. In the model at hand, the Designer strives for retaining a connected residual network, while the Adversary tries to disconnect the network.
As a first step we succeeded to fully characterize the set of possible equilibria of the game, i.e. the possible equilibrium defended networks, for an attack budget of one or two nodes. In case of a budget of one, this set consists of the undefended empty network, the centrally-protected star and the unprotected circle. We further showed that the centrally-protected star as the only network using node defense can only be an equilibrium solution for a low number of nodes and a low probability of destruction of defended nodes.
For an attack budget of two nodes we showed that more solutions are possible for the game. The set of possible equilibria is constituted by the unprotected empty network, the centrally-protected star, the fully protected circle, the unprotected wheel, and one or two intermediately defended 2-connected networks, depending on the total number of nodes.
In case of a general attack budget of k a nodes the set of possible equilibrium defended networks was partially characterized. Given a number of nodes and an attack budget, we defined a group of networks that we demonstrated to include all possible k a -connected equilibria.
As the main technical contribution we extended the seminal result of Harary (1962) , who showed that the k-connected network of n nodes with minimal number of links has ⌈kn/2⌉ links. Similarly, we identified the minimum number of links for a k-connected network with p essential nodes.
Our results suggest that for the problem of optimal network design not only the cost structure is an important variable for the decision, but also the extent of the threat. If the connectivity of a (large) network shall be secured against the threat of a single node-deletion, when high enough connectivity is the best choice. If, in turn, a threat of several simultaneous attacks is given, then facing imperfect defense it may be optimal to mix the two mechanisms of direct node defense and a high degree of connectivity.
Regarding future research, it would be most interesting yet technically challenging to analyze the game for different utility functions. The here proposed connectivity game undoubtedly is a valid starting point for the analysis and already yielded interesting insights, yet one could think of other, presumably more realistic utility functions, e.g. a utility function being additively separable in components of the residual network and convex and increasing in component sizes (see e.g. Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) ). Finally, the literature on network design proposes different rules of attack, such as contagion of attack to connected and unprotected nodes, or even link attack. Regarding these on the basis of imperfect defense would add to the understanding of the network design game.
